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Abstract
To take development and budgeting decisions for research activi-
ties the officials in charge need to constantly evaluate and assess the
quality of research. Over the years a handful of scoring methods for
academic journals have been proposed. Discussing the most prominent
methods (de facto standards) we show that they cannot distinguish
quality from quantity at article level and that they are inherently
biased against journals publishing more articles. If we consider the
length of a journal by the number of pages or characters, then all
methods are biased against lengthier journals. The systematic bias
we find is analytically tractable and implies that the methods are ma-
nipulable. We show that the strategies for successful manipulation
are relatively easy to infer and implement. The implications of our
findings extend beyond the evaluation of academic research, to related
settings like the ranking of web domains. Non-manipulable methods
for measuring intellectual influence exist.
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“We are a group of economists including current and former editors of Econo-
metrica, the American Economic Review, and the Review of Economic Stud-
ies, several past Presidents of the Econometric Society, the incoming Pres-
ident of the American Economic Association [...]. We [...] recognize that
the assessment of the significance of a publication depends heavily on the
reputation of the journal in which it is published. [...] Journal of Economic
Theory’s [...] reputation is supported by numerical measures, such as the
impact factor.”
– Theoretical Economics, Open Letter to Promotion Committees 1
“The perception that the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) rewards pub-
lication in journals with high impact factors is affecting decisions made by
authors about where to publish. We urge HEFCE to remind RAE panels that
they are obliged to assess the quality of the content of individual articles, not
the reputation of the journal in which they are published.”
– The Research Assessment Exercise2
1 Introduction
The last decades saw an explosion in the number of academic journals. Re-
searchers find it more and more difficult to keep up with the growing literature
even in narrow fields. Libraries face higher subscription fees and must allo-
cate budgets in an efficient way. Promotion decisions are often taken based
on researchers’ publications. National organizations for scientific research
steer the course of science by funding proposals based on their potential
and on the publication record of the applicants. However, the quality of
the publications, approximated by the containing journals’ quality indica-
tor, is becoming increasingly difficult to evaluate and compare and there is a
growing interest in finding measures, both cardinal and ordinal, that would
allow for an objective assessment. To this end, various scoring methods and
ranking rules have been devised. The former capture the cardinal aspect, by
giving scores to each journal, and the latter capture the ordinal aspect, by
establishing an order of preference among the journals.
Loosely speaking, a scoring (ranking) problem can be thought of as a
social choice problem where a social welfare function is used to obtain total
1Available online at: http://www.econtheory.org/ProComLt.pdf
2House of Commons - Science and Technology - Tenth Report. 2004-07-07. Available
online at:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmsctech/399/39912.htm
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preorders on the set of alternatives, with the additional requirement that
the set of agents and the set of alternatives coincide.3 That is, journals are
asked to express their opinions about each other and themselves. Citations
made by a journal are considered to be votes about the importance of the
destination journal and a scoring method is used to aggregate the information
and determine a score for each journal. Each scoring method induces a
ranking rule.
In practice, the predominant scoring methods used for the measurement
of intellectual influence are the impact factor (Garfield, 1955), the LP method
(Liebowitz and Palmer, 1984; Laband and Piette, 1994), and the invariant
method (Pinski and Narin, 1976). The last two methods generated many
variations of great practical importance. The best known is the PageRank
algorithm (Brin and Page, 1998) which is at the core of how search engines
rank web pages. Another variation is known as the DeGroot (1974) model,
which is used in models of learning in social and communication networks
(Golub and Jackson, 2010), physics, and computer science (Sobel, 2000).
Despite their extensive usage, the above scoring methods have only been
intuitively motivated, if at all. We are familiar with two notable excep-
tions which present characterizations. Given the invariant method, Palacios-
Huerta and Volij (2004) find a set of cardinal properties that fully characterize
it. Given the PageRank algorithm, Altman and Tennenholtz (2005) find a
set of ordinal properties that fully characterize it.
This paper complements the efforts made towards a better understand-
ing of scoring methods from a normative perspective: while we do not derive
a characterization of any scoring method, we formalize a sensible property,
and then check if the currently most used methods satisfy it. We call our
property invariance to article-splitting. Intuitively, this property requires
a scoring method to assign the same valuation to any two journals having
similar citation patterns but publishing a different number of articles. An-
other interpretation for our property is to say that everything else equal,
publishing a number of results in distinct papers or together as a survey or
a book should make no difference, that is, the scoring method should assign
the same value for both the former and the latter. We discuss the case in
which the scoring methods take as input the number of pages or characters
rather than the number of articles (see Mirrlees, Neary, and Tirole (2003)
for a good survey of works that opt for this approach), and we also inter-
pret our property in the context of ordering web domains. Palacios-Huerta
3Note that despite the fact that the models are closely related, they lead to very
different results: for example, Shoham and Leyton-Brown (2009, Proposition 9.5.1) show
that Arrow’s impossibility result holds exclusively in a social choice setting.
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and Volij (2004) were the first to introduce invariance properties for scoring
methods. However, their properties are not directly related to our invariance
to article-splitting. In particular, with Theorem 1, Step 3, we show that the
invariant method, which is characterized by their properties does not satisfy
invariance to article-splitting.
We find that the impact factor, LP method, and the invariant method
do not satisfy invariance to article-splitting. Moreover, with Theorem 1 we
find a systematic bias common to all methods favoring journals with fewer
articles (or pages, or characters). While invariance to article-splitting is a
cardinal property, we give Example 2 where the valuations are sufficiently
biased to affect the ordinal ranking.
For the classification of academic journals, our results have several impli-
cations. First, whether we control for sheer size using the number of pages
or the number of articles has a profound effect on the classification results.
Second, we find that quality and quantity are indistinguishable at article
level. Third, it is a direct consequence of our results that the scoring meth-
ods presented are manipulable, and we suggest how in principle publishers or
editors could artificially boost the scores of their journals. Finally, we discuss
how our findings can reach beyond the journal setting, to settings of great
practical importance like the classification of web domains.
2 Scoring Methods
Let J = {1, ..., n} denote a non-empty finite set of journals. For each i, j ∈ J ,
cij represents the number of citations to journal i by journal j, that is, the
number of references made by journal j to journal i. Let us consider a
n × n nonnegative citation matrix C = {cij}i,j∈J . Let cj =
∑
i∈J cij denote
the total number of citations made by j and let DC denote the diagonal
matrix with the elements in {cj}j∈J along the diagonal. Let the entries of
the nonnegative vector a denote the number of articles in each journal and
let A be the diagonal matrix with the elements in {aj}j∈J along the diagonal.
For each vector z ∈ Rn, we denote the 1-norm of z by ||z|| =∑i=ni=1 |zi|.
Definition 1. A scoring problem is a triple (J, a, C) consisting of a finite
set of journals J , a vector a ∈ Nn containing the number of published articles
and a citation matrix C = {cij}i,j∈J .
Let S denote the set of scoring problems. The score for each journal in
J is given by the transposed valuations vector vT = (v1, v2, ..., vn), where vi
is interpreted as the value of a representative article in journal i.
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Definition 2. A scoring method φ maps a scoring problem (J, a, C) ∈ S to
a valuations vector v ∈ Rn.
A scoring method induces a weak ordering of the journals via the ranking
rule i < j if and only if for all i, j ∈ J , vi ≥ vj. Ties, i.e., i < j and j < i,
are allowed, but only occur if vi = vj.
The impact factor (Garfield, 1955) considers all citations received by an
article to have the same value and measures the direct influence that a typical
article in journal i has on all journals.
Definition 3. The impact factor gives valuations according to the unique
vector v that solves
A−1Ce = v (1)
where e is a vector of ones of dimension J and the matrices A and C contain
data for a two-year period.
The next two scoring methods assign different values to citations received
based on the importance of the journal that made the citation. The im-
portance of each journal is established endogenously and simultaneously for
all journals in each method, using convergent iterative procedures. Roughly
speaking, the LP method (Liebowitz and Palmer, 1984) gives valuations that
reflect the influence that a typical article in journal i has on journal j. The in-
variant method (Pinski and Narin, 1976) is a modification of the LP method
such that the valuations given are also weighted by the reference intensity
(i.e., the average number of citations made by a typical article in j).
For a formal presentation, we need an additional assumption and some
extra notation. We require the citation matrix C to be primitive4: there
should be no partition of the set of journals J in two sets J1 and J2 such that
i) there are no inter partition citations or ii) all inter partition citations are
unidirectional, say from journals in J2 to journals in J1, and we should have at
least one self-citing journal. This is a very natural and plausible assumption
for classifying journals within the same field, and from a technical perspective
it ensures that the following scoring methods are well defined.5
Definition 4. The LP method gives valuations according to the unique vec-
tor v that solves
A−1Cv
||A−1Cv|| = v. (2)
4It is well known that a sufficient condition for a matrix to be primitive is to be
nonnegative and irreducible with at least a positive element on the main diagonal.
5Under this assumption the iterative procedures defining the following two methods
are known to converge. We give directly the steady-state equations.
5
Definition 5. The invariant method gives valuations according to the unique
vector v that solves
A−1CD−1C Av = v. (3)
3 Article-Splitting and Manipulability
In this section we introduce a basic desirable property of a scoring method:
invariance to article-splitting. When we refer to an article’s citations, we
consider both citations made (that we interpret as an article’s “consump-
tion”) and received (that we interpret as an article’s “production” which was
consumed by other articles). We require that if a paper is split into k sub-
papers, then the citations are split among them. Conversely, if a set of k
articles with no overlapping citations and published in the same journal are
merged into a single longer paper, then the resulting publication collects all
citations. Our invariance property requires that having the split ex-post or
ex-ante should make no difference. That is, splitting the citations between
the sections of a paper, or publishing sub-papers, leave the journals’ valuation
unchanged. The above interpretation implicitly assumes that there are two
separable layers of citations: background citations, that are used merely to
position and relate an article to the relevant literature, and active citations,
that are made (received) by an article for actively consuming (producing)
knowledge. Article-splitting is then natural to assume for active citations,
but less so for background citations.
Formally, let λj ∈ R, λj > 1, be a splitting factor and consider two
ranking problems {(J, a, C), (J, a′, C)} ⊆ S where for some journal j ∈ J ,
a′j = λjaj and for all other journals i 6= j, a′i = ai. Let S = (J, a, C) and
S ′ = (J, a′, C). For the two problems S, S ′ ∈ S defined as above, S ′ is an
article-split modification of S.
Definition 6. A scoring method φ is invariant to article-splitting if for any
two problems S, S ′ ∈ S such that S ′ is an article-split modification of S,
φj(S) = φj(S
′).
Observe that the citation matrix is not affected: the number of citations does
not change, they are only distributed among more papers. The property thus
relates scoring problems implicating journals having the same citation pat-
terns but publishing different numbers of articles. Note that in each of the
scoring methods introduced in the previous section, a journals’ opinion is
given by the aggregated opinions of the articles contained in it. Hence, each
component of the valuation vector produced by each method can be inter-
preted as a measure of the intellectual influence per typical article published
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in a journal. However, there is a considerable heterogeneity in the length of
a typical article even for journals within the same field. Some journals differ
also in terms of page size. The applied studies of (Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas,
and Stengos, 2003; Combes and Linnemer, 2003; Coupe´, 2003) correct for
this by computing scores per page or per character, not per article. Rein-
terpreting our invariance to article-splitting in this context, the property
requires that for journals with similar citation patterns and the same num-
ber of articles, the number of pages per article (or per characters) should
not matter. The following example gives a more vivid representation of the
situation described.
Example 1. Invariance to article-splitting when scores are computed per page,
or per character.
Assume that the editorial board of a journal accepts a number of articles.
Consider the following scenarios: i) the articles are published as such, or ii)
for some of the articles the authors are requested to shorten their length,
by relegating inessential details to the “web appendix”. The web appendix
is available on-line but it is not part of the printed journal, whose length is
taken as input by the scoring methods. Observe that scenario ii) leads to
a shorter journal in terms of pages or characters than scenario i), and that
the citations made (received) by an article are invariant between scenarios,
as typically there are no citations made (received) on inessential details.
Invariance to article-splitting requires the score of the journal to be the same
in both scenarios.
Next, we define manipulability and we formalize a systematic deviation
from invariance to article-splitting.
Definition 7. A scoring method φ is manipulable if a journal can increase
its valuation unilaterally.
Definition 8. A scoring method φ is biased against article-splitting if for
any two problems S, S ′ ∈ S such that S ′ is an article-split modification of S,
φj(S) > φj(S
′).
Remark 1. If a method is biased against article-splitting then it is manipu-
lable.
4 Results
In the following, we show that none of the listed scoring methods is invariant
to article-splitting.
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Theorem 1. The impact factor, the LP method and the invariant method
are biased against article-splitting.
Proof. Let S, S ′ ∈ S be such that S ′ is an article-split modification of S. We
now proceed in several (independent) steps.
Step 1: The impact factor is biased against article-splitting.
Observe that v′j =
aj
a′j
vj =
1
λj
vj. Hence, v
′
j < vj, and for all i 6= j, v′i = vi.
The result is independent of the fact that the impact factor is calculated for
a period of two years.
Step 2: The LP method is biased against article-splitting.
Adapting a technique introduced by Roy, Saberi, and Wan (2008), we
show that an increase in the number of articles of a journal decreases its
valuation. Let Γ = A−1C and Γ′ = A′−1C. Then, for S and S ′, the LP
method gives valuations according to vectors v and v′ that solve the following
equations:
Γv = ||Γv||v, (4)
Γ′v′ = ||Γ′v′||v′. (5)
Equations (4) and (5) are algebraic eigenvalue problems: %(Γ) = ||Γv||
is the spectral radius of Γ and v the eigenvector associated with %(Γ), and
%(Γ′) = ||Γ′v′||, Γ′, v′ are similar. Since the matrix Γ is primitive, Γ′ is also
primitive and (5) is well defined. Since for all i ∈ J , a′i ≥ ai, Γ′ is weakly
smaller in every entry than Γ. Therefore, there exists δ > 0 such that:
%(Γ′) = %(Γ)− δ. (6)
We scale v′ such that v′j = vj and rewrite v
′T as vT = vT − xT = [v1 −
x1, ..., vj−xj, ..., vn−xn] where x ∈ Rn such that xj = 0. By (5), Γ′v = %(Γ′)v.
Replacing v, %(Γ′) and using (4), we have:
Γ′v − Γ′x = %(Γ′)v − %(Γ′)x = %(Γ)v − δv − %(Γ′)x = Γv − δv − %(Γ′)x (7)
Let v−j, x−j ∈ R|J−{j}|, where vi, xi > 0, be the valuation vectors except
for journal j, and let Γ−j and Γ′−j be the matrices Γ and Γ
′ where we removed
row and column j. Note that Γ−j = Γ′−j. Dropping the j’th equation from
the system of Equations 7, we obtain6:
Γ−jx−j = δv−j + %(Γ′)x−j. (8)
6For clarity, we detail this step in Appendix A.
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Rearranging terms:
(%(Γ′)I − Γ−j)x−j = −δv−j. (9)
Define N =
Γ−j
%(Γ′) , and M = (I−N). Since Γ−j and %(Γ′) are nonnegative,
N is entrywise nonnegative, i.e., N ≥ 0. Marcus and Minc (1975) show that
the spectral radius of a primitive matrix is greater than the spectral radius
of any of its submatrices. Hence, %(Γ′) > %(Γ′−j) = %(Γ−j). Thus, the moduli
of the eigenvalues of N < 1, and consequently lim
t→∞
N t = 0. But:
I −Nk+1 = M(I +N +N2 + · · ·+Nk). (10)
Letting k → ∞, I = M∑k=∞k=0 Nk. Premultiplying by M−1, we have
M−1 =
∑k=∞
k=0 N
k. Since N ≥ 0, M−1 ≥ 0. Observing that in (9) the vector
v−j is positive, x−j has to be negative. Hence, vj = vj and for all i 6= j,
vi > vi. Rescaling v to v
′, we have
v′j
v′i
<
vj
vi
. Since v′j = vj, for all i 6= j,
v′i > vi.
Step 3: The invariant method is biased against article-splitting.
Observe that v′, defined as v′j =
1
λj
vj and v
′
i = vi for i 6= j, is the solution
of:
A′−1CD−1C A
′v′ = v′. (11)
In order to see this, premultiply (3) by A, and (11) by A′. Then, note that
A′v′ = Av. Finally observe that as λj > 1, v′j < vj, while the valuations of
other journals have not changed.
Note that for the impact factor and for the invariant method the valuation
of a journal j whose articles are split into λj articles decreases by a factor
of 1
λj
. For an appropriate choice of λj, the decrease can be arbitrarily low.
In particular, it can be lower than the valuation of the journal ranked next,
thus changing also the ranking of the journals. Similarly, an increase in the
number of articles of journal j decreases its relative valuation given by the
LP method, which may also affect journal j’s ranking.
The following example shows that the bias against article-splitting of the
scoring methods above may also induce changes in the ranking of the journals:
Example 2. Let J = {j1, j2, j3}, a = (2, 2, 3), a′ = (4, 2, 3) and define C as:
C =
 12 8 46 10 2
3 3 9

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Let S = (J, a, C) and S ′ = (J, a′, C) be two ranking problems and note that
the only difference between S and S ′ is that a′1 = λ1a1, with λ1 = 2. For
each problem S and S ′, the following table presents the normalized vector of
valuations (so that the entries add up to 1) produced by each scoring method.
φIF (S) φIF (S
′) φIM(S) φIM(S ′) φLP (S) φLP (S)
j1 0.46 0.30 0.48 0.31 0.50 0.29
j2 0.35 0.45 0.33 0.44 0.37 0.51
j3 0.19 0.25 0.19 0.25 0.13 0.20
Table 1: Article-splitting bias in scoring methods inducing changes in the
ranking of the journals.
Note that for S, all scoring methods induce the ranking j1  j2  j3, while
for S ′, all scoring methods induce the ranking j2  j1  j3.
Theorem 1 clearly indicates how to manipulate scoring methods. Should
the methods take as input the number of articles, then publishers or editors
might opt to implement a policy of publishing a small number of articles.
Alternatively, if the number of pages or characters is taken as input, pref-
erence can be given to publishing briefer communications. Recall Example
1. In principle, editors requests of discarding inessential details by relegating
them to the web appendix are desirable, as we don’t want to waste valuable
resources such as journal pages and reader’s time for irrelevant details. How-
ever, the same requests might easily be abused to game the scoring methods.
Assume that the editors ask for a significant shortening of the paper, and
now even relevant details, as opposed to only irrelevant ones, are relegated
to the web appendix. This is unlikely to affect the citations made/received
by the article.7 As there is definitely a gray zone in what should be printed
and what is inessential, such manipulation is easy, its detection is hard, and
by Example 2 it is clear that in principle a manipulating editor is even able
to quantify the effectiveness of his action.
Interestingly, essentially the same methods are used by search engines for
obtaining the ranking of web pages. The following example aims to clarify
this analogy.
Example 3. The ranking of web domains.
Professor X acquires the domain “www.ProfessorX.net” and aims to make
the following types of information available online: research, teaching, and
7Typically there are no citations made in discarded parts. In terms of received citations,
when needed, readers will acquire the full details from the web (either from the author’s
page providing a full copy of the article or from the journal’s web appendix), but always
cite the article in the journal.
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contact details. There are two natural options: i) to put all available in-
formation on one page, each type in a separate section, or ii) to create one
distinct web page for each type. Note that ProfessorX is only interested
in the ranking of his domain and that the links that his domain typically
makes/receives are invariant under i), ii). In this case, search engines like
Google or Bing use essentially the same methods as the one used for the rank-
ing of academic journals: their algorithm relies on the LP-method where the
left eigenvector is computed, i.e., the weight for each page is given by the
components of vector v that solves vA
−1CT
||vA−1CT || = v, where each entry cij in
the transposed matrix CT can be thought of as the number of links made
by domain i to domain j out of the total links made by i, and ai as the
number of web pages per domain.8 By Theorem 1 it is a dominant strategy
for ProfessorX to aggregate all information on a single page.9
More generally, owners of web domains have incentives to manipulate for
economic profit: a higher placement in Google results drives more internet
traffic which in turn yields higher sales or advertisement revenues. Reinter-
preting Theorem 1 in this context reveals that a domain owner can improve
the score for his domain by jamming all his data on a single omniscient sheet.
5 Conclusion
Applied studies have long suggested that the scoring methods used for rank-
ing academic journals may not be immune to various biases. We derive
analytically that one such bias exists. For journals with similar citation
patterns, the journals publishing fewer articles are privileged to the ones
publishing more articles. If we account for the length of a journal based on
the number of pages or characters, then the current scoring methods give
extra credit to shorter more formal journals and punish those that make an
effort of keeping good English in their articles. Consequently, if the journals
have the same number of articles, more credit is given to the ones publish-
ing shorter articles. Thus, the currently most used scoring methods share a
common drawback: they cannot distinguish quality from quantity at article
level. Furthermore, observe that for a journal with relatively numerous ar-
ticles but few pages, measuring its influence by taking the number of pages
or articles as input will make a crucial difference. One must therefore use
8The exact algorithms used by search engines are both a moving target and a black box,
but the characteristics to which we make the analogy to here are known to be relatively
stable (see for example Langville and Meyer (2006)).
9The same technique used in Step 2 of Theorem 1 can be easily adapted for the left
eigenvector and leads to the same qualitative conclusions.
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and interpret the valuations and the induced rankings with care when esti-
mating the quality of journals. Hence, our findings support the suggestion
in the Research Assessment Exercise to be cautious about the current de
facto practices in economics emphasized by the Open Letter to Promotion
Committees in Theoretical Economics, and call for putting the traditional
economic tools at work to obtain a better understanding of the properties
satisfied by various “numerical measures.”
A consequence of our results is that the current methods for measuring
influence are manipulable, and that the strategies that increase the payoffs
are relatively easy to infer and implement. This is a concern for the evaluation
of research and also in closely related settings like raking web domains.
It is an open question to find endogenous bounds for what variations can
be allowed for the journals or users to input in the scoring methods without
inducing changes in the associated rankings. It would be also interesting to
find bounds for what is maximally achievable in terms of both score and rank
by manipulating.
Finally, we note that not all rankings are subject to such bias. In the
case of the H-index (Hirsch, 2004; Braun, Gla¨nzel, and Schubert, 2006) it is
easy to see that article-splitting has an ambiguous effect, while the tourna-
ment method (Ko´czy and Strobel, 2007) is by definition invariant to article-
splitting.
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A Appendix
Writing equality 7 in detail for the left most and right most terms of the equality, we obtain the following system of
equations:
1
a1
[(v1c11 + · · ·+ vnc1n)− (x1c11 + · · ·+ xj−1c1j−1 + xj+1c1j+1 + · · ·+ xnc1n)] = 1a1 (v1c11 + · · ·+ vnc1n)− δv1 − %(Γ′)x1
...
1
a′j
[(v1cj1 + · · ·+ vncjn)− (x1cj1 + · · ·+ xj−1cjj−1 + xj+1cjj+1 + · · ·+ xncjn)] = 1aj (v1cj1 + · · ·+ vncjn)− δvj − %(Γ′)xj
...
1
an
[(v1cn1 + · · ·+ vncnn)− (x1cn1 + · · ·+ xj−1cnj−1 + xj+1cnj+1 + · · ·+ xncnn)] = 1an (v1cn1 + · · ·+ vncnn)− δvn − %(Γ′)xn
After canceling terms and dropping the j’th row from the system of equations above, we obtain:
1
a1
(x1c11 + · · ·+ xj−1c1j−1 + xj+1c1j+1 + · · ·+ xnc1n) = δv1 + %(Γ′)x1
...
1
aj−1
(x1cj−11 + · · ·+ xj−1cj−1j−1 + xj+1cj−1j+1 + · · ·+ xncj−1n) = δvj−1 + %(Γ′)xj−1
1
aj+1
(x1cj+11 + · · ·+ xj−1cj+1j−1 + xj+1cj+1j+1 + · · ·+ xncj+1n) = δvj+1 + %(Γ′)xj+1
...
1
an
(x1cn1 + · · ·+ xj−1cnj−1 + xj+1cnj+1 + · · ·+ xncnn) = δvn + %(Γ′)xn
Rewriting the above system of equations using vector and matrix notation yields equation 8.
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